Underwriting fees and shareholder rights

Ji Chai Lin, Bahar Ulupinar

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

4 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Do firms' governance provisions affect their terms of obtaining external financing? We hypothesize that it is more difficult for firms with more restrictions on shareholder rights to raise external equity, and that since analyst coverage is an important part of underwriting services, underwriters would use analyst recommendations to promote issuing firms with weaker shareholder rights more strongly and charge them higher underwriting fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that analyst recommendations on issuing firms with weak shareholder rights increase more than those with strong shareholder rights prior to SEOs, and that underwriting spreads are positively related to issuing firms' shareholder rights as proxied by the G-index. Furthermore, the effect of shareholder rights on underwriting fees is largely contained in the six provisions in the E-index.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)1276-1303
頁數28
期刊Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
40
發行號9-10
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 11月 2013

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