RISK-SHIFTING BEHAVIOR AT COMMERCIAL BANKS WITH DIFFERENT DEPOSIT INSURANCE ASSESSMENTS: FURTHER EVIDENCE FROM U.S. MARKETS

Chuang Chang Chang, Ruey Jenn Ho

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

5 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

In this article, we investigate both the risk-shifting behavior of banks and the extent to which risk was controlled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation adopted a risk-based assessment system in U.S. markets. The risk-shifting behavior of commercial banks was significantly mitigated by the adoption of a risk-based deposit insurance assessment system. The risk-shifting incentive remains, especially for less capitalized or higher premium banks, which suggests that during 1992–2008, risk-based assessments reduced but did not eliminate the moral hazard problem in banks. Moreover, the results reveal that larger banks did not risk shift more than did smaller banks following the 1991 deposit insurance reform.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)55-80
頁數26
期刊Journal of Financial Research
40
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 1 1月 2017

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