Liquidation threat: Behavior of CEO entrenchment

Chien Chiang Lee, Chih Wei Wang

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This study investigated the effect of CEO entrenchment on a firm's debt maturity choice. We examine US firms using the 2006–2017 sample period and find that entrenched managers choose debt with longer maturity financing to avoid early liquidation. Additionally, we detect a possible channel between entrenchment and debt maturity using shareholder-initiated proposals. Finally, firms with high (low) informational opacity (credit quality) will force entrenched managers to extend their debt maturity. We provide useful policy implications for shareholders and investors and new insights into CEO entrenchment, debt maturity, and shareholder-initiated proposals.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
文章編號102949
期刊Finance Research Letters
47
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 6月 2022

指紋

深入研究「Liquidation threat: Behavior of CEO entrenchment」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。

引用此