International joint ventures, technology licensing and ownership structure

Hamid Beladi, May Hu, Tan Lee

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

摘要

To enter into a host country market with significant technological distance, a multinational corporation forms a joint venture affiliate with a local partner and collects licensing royalties from the affiliate. Both parties to the joint venture simultaneously decide their respective equity shares and the capital capacity of a continuous investment project via Nash bargaining. Since the multinational corporation receives licensing royalties from its local partner, it will therefore hold a share smaller than its relative bargaining power. In addition, the multinational firm will demand a larger ownership share if the royalty rate is lower, or the repurchase price of capital becomes lower. The joint venture firm will install a higher capital capacity when entering the host-country market if the price either to repurchase or to resell capital becomes higher. This capacity installation decision, however, will not be affected by the licensing royalty rate.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
期刊International Journal of Economic Theory
DOIs
出版狀態已被接受 - 2021

指紋

深入研究「International joint ventures, technology licensing and ownership structure」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。

引用此