摘要
Using the representative agent approach as in Kaplow (Am Econ Rev 82:1013-1017, 1992b), this paper shows that providing tax deductions for the individual's net losses is socially optimal when the insurer faces the risk of insolvency. We further show that the government should adopt a higher tax deduction rate for net losses when the insurer is insolvent than when the insurer is solvent. Thus, tax deductions for net losses could be used to provide an insurance for individuals against the insurer's risk of insolvency. These findings could also be used to explain why a government provides supplementary public insurance or government relief. Finally, we discuss that, if the individuals are heterogeneous in terms of loss severity, loss probability, or income level, providing a tax deduction for the individual's net losses may not always achieve a Pareto improvement, and cross subsidization should be taken into consideration.
原文 | ???core.languages.en_GB??? |
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頁(從 - 到) | 129-145 |
頁數 | 17 |
期刊 | GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review |
卷 | 32 |
發行號 | 2 |
DOIs | |
出版狀態 | 已出版 - 12月 2007 |