Insurance bargaining under ambiguity

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

7 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)812-820
頁數9
期刊Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
53
發行號3
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 1 10月 2013

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