Effects of managerial overconfidence on analyst recommendations

Mei Chen Lin, Po Hsin Ho, Hsiang Lin Chih

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

4 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This study investigates the relation between managerial overconfidence and analyst recommendations. The empirical finding shows that analysts are less likely to issue upgrade recommendations for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Similarly, analysts spend a longer time to upgrade stocks associated with overconfident CEOs. The effect of CEO overconfidence on recommendation revisions is non-monotonic. Analysts are more reluctant to upgrade firms with highly-overconfident CEOs. More experienced analysts are less susceptible to managerial overconfidence. Moreover, investors exhibit stronger response to recommendations for firms with overconfident CEOs.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)73-99
頁數27
期刊Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
53
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 15 7月 2019

指紋

深入研究「Effects of managerial overconfidence on analyst recommendations」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。

引用此