TY - JOUR
T1 - Dual Defection Incentives in One System
T2 - Party Switching under Taiwan's Single non-transferable Vote
AU - Chang, Alex
AU - Tang, Yen Chen
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015.
PY - 2015/10/28
Y1 - 2015/10/28
N2 - Political scientists generally consider that the incentive for legislators to switch parties lies in their desire to be re-elected. While some scholars attribute defection to the legislators' popularity and strong connections with their constituents which enable them to be re-elected without relying on party labels, others assert that legislators switch if they perceive that staying put might threaten their chances of re-election. In this paper, we find that the two assumptions, to some extent, contradict each other. More surprisingly, the two contradictory hypotheses cohabit under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. From an analysis of the switching in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, the empirical evidence shows that because of fierce intraparty competition in the multimember districts, not only barely elected but also top-ranked legislators switched party affiliation in order to avoid the loss in votes or even seats to their copartisans and to maximize their chances of re-election.
AB - Political scientists generally consider that the incentive for legislators to switch parties lies in their desire to be re-elected. While some scholars attribute defection to the legislators' popularity and strong connections with their constituents which enable them to be re-elected without relying on party labels, others assert that legislators switch if they perceive that staying put might threaten their chances of re-election. In this paper, we find that the two assumptions, to some extent, contradict each other. More surprisingly, the two contradictory hypotheses cohabit under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. From an analysis of the switching in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, the empirical evidence shows that because of fierce intraparty competition in the multimember districts, not only barely elected but also top-ranked legislators switched party affiliation in order to avoid the loss in votes or even seats to their copartisans and to maximize their chances of re-election.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84949216448&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S1468109915000274
DO - 10.1017/S1468109915000274
M3 - 回顧評介論文
AN - SCOPUS:84949216448
SN - 1468-1099
VL - 16
SP - 489
EP - 506
JO - Japanese Journal of Political Science
JF - Japanese Journal of Political Science
IS - 4
ER -