摘要
This research examines the effect of CEOs’ ability concerning their debt maturity choice. Examining public firms over the period 1997–2016 in Taiwan, we find that high-ability managers choose short-term debt financing to signal their ability. We adopt the rollover risk channel to prove that managers signal their ability on the use of short-term debt are only from their intention. In addition, we consider the separation of ownership and control as well as information opacity, which could force managers to have a greater incentive to use short-term debt for signaling their ability to align the managers-shareholders conflict and maintain their reputation, compensation, and bonus from being affected by information opacity.
原文 | ???core.languages.en_GB??? |
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頁(從 - 到) | 632-648 |
頁數 | 17 |
期刊 | Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics |
卷 | 29 |
發行號 | 3 |
DOIs | |
出版狀態 | 已出版 - 2022 |