Debt maturity choice in CEOs’ incentive to signal abilities

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This research examines the effect of CEOs’ ability concerning their debt maturity choice. Examining public firms over the period 1997–2016 in Taiwan, we find that high-ability managers choose short-term debt financing to signal their ability. We adopt the rollover risk channel to prove that managers signal their ability on the use of short-term debt are only from their intention. In addition, we consider the separation of ownership and control as well as information opacity, which could force managers to have a greater incentive to use short-term debt for signaling their ability to align the managers-shareholders conflict and maintain their reputation, compensation, and bonus from being affected by information opacity.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)632-648
頁數17
期刊Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics
29
發行號3
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 2022

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