CEO inside debt and convertible bonds

Wei Hsien Li, S. Ghon Rhee, Carl Hsin han Shen

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

9 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

The question whether convertible bonds are issued to combat the risk-shifting problem is a subject of debate in the literature, primarily because of the unavailability of clear measures regarding managerial risk-shifting incentives. Taking advantage of recently developed inside debt-holding measures for CEOs, we find strong evidence in support of the risk-shifting hypothesis. When a CEO holds a large amount of inside debt, three distinct patterns emerge: (i) the firm exhibits a lower ratio of outstanding convertibles to total debt; (ii) the firm is less likely to issue convertibles than straight debt; and (iii) the firm devises contract terms to decrease the chance of conversion when it issues convertibles.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)232-249
頁數18
期刊Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
45
發行號1-2
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 1 1月 2018

指紋

深入研究「CEO inside debt and convertible bonds」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。

引用此