CEO compensation and firm performance: Evidence from financially constrained firms

Qian Long Kweh, Imen Tebourbi, Huai Chun Lo, Cheng Tsu Huang

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

We examine how financial constraints affect the relationship between firm performance and the CEO compensation of U.S. listed corporations during the period 1996–2018. Our results indicate that financial constraints negatively moderate the positive relationships between firm performance and CEO compensation. That is, financially constrained firms that perform well financially will increase their CEO compensation at a smaller rate than their counterparts because financially constrained firms tend to hoard cash to save cost and safeguard for future investment, liquidity and leverage policies. However, the negative impact of financial constraints on the positive pay-performance sensitivity is more pronounced in the bonus sample. That is, financially constrained firms control bonus increments to control costs even when their firm performance improves. Overall, our results, which are robust to a battery of tests, explain why prior studies show minimal pay-performance sensitivity and the need to account for the financial constraints of a company in designing CEO compensation.

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文章編號101671
期刊Research in International Business and Finance
61
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 10月 2022

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