Barrier Penetration Routing Against Wireless Spy Sensors

Kazuya Sakai, Min Te Sun, Wei Shinn Ku, Jie Wu

研究成果: 雜誌貢獻期刊論文同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

We consider a potential communication problem in national security, where wireless spy sensors with eavesdropping capability are strategically deployed around an area of interest. For counterintelligence, achieving secure communication by penetrating such a spy barrier is of great importance. In this paper, we first formulate the problem of barrier penetration routing against spy barriers consisting of strategically deployed wireless sensors. We point out that existing multi-path avoidance routing protocols cannot efficiently counteract collusion attacks, where connected adversaries collaborate with each other to compromise data packets. We propose a barrier penetration routing (BPR) protocol to securely penetrate the barrier of adversaries. In the protocol, a set of physically distanced paths are identified based on distance vectors as well as network-wide flooding. Then, each data packet encoded by xor coding is routed via a different path. Unlike existing avoidance routing, the proposed scheme does not rely on the assumption that the adversary's locations are known. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed BPR outperforms the baseline protocol as well as existing routing protocols in terms of secure delivery rate.

原文???core.languages.en_GB???
頁(從 - 到)4634-4647
頁數14
期刊IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
23
發行號5
DOIs
出版狀態已出版 - 1 5月 2024

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