Abstract
This study examines the effect of family-control ownership on the relationship between the cost of bank debts and the risk of rolling over maturing debts into new debts. We examine Taiwanese firms during 1996–2015 and find that, among all firms exposed to rollover risk, firms with family-control ownership pay more interest on bank loans than firms with nonfamily-control ownership. Furthermore, the loan cost increasing effect is stronger for family-control firms with informational opacity and poorer credit quality. Our evidence supports the agency theory argument that family-control ownership intensifies the shareholder–debtholder conflict associated with the rollover risk. As such, this investigation provides novel empirical insights into the firm-level interaction among family control, rollover risk, and bank debt costs.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 362-378 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Pacific Basin Finance Journal |
Volume | 53 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2019 |
Keywords
- Bank loan
- Family-control ownership
- Rollover risk
- Short-term debt