Insurance bargaining under ambiguity

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This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)812-820
Number of pages9
JournalInsurance: Mathematics and Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Nov 2013


  • Ambiguity
  • Ambiguity aversion
  • Cooperative bargaining
  • Insurance bargaining
  • Non-cooperative bargaining


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