CEO tenure in Taiwanese family and nonfamily firms: An agency theory perspective

Wen Hsien Tsai, Jung Hua Hung, Yi Chen Kuo, Lopin Kuo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

94 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled, 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)11-28
Number of pages18
JournalFamily Business Review
Volume19
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2006

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