Building cooperation in VOIP network through a reward mechanism

Yung Ming Li, Ding Yuan Cheng, Jhih Hua Jhang-Li

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

1 Scopus citations


In this paper, for solving the moral hazard problem of super nodes in VOIP network and achieving better communication quality, we establish a reward mechanism based on classical efficiency-wage models. In the reward mechanism, the function of reward is to encourage super nodes to contribute their bandwidth and cover their effort costs, whereas the function of fine is to prevent opportunistic super nodes from shirking. We consider that network quality and idle bandwidth are the essential criterions for selecting qualified super nodes. Once all super nodes can satisfy specific conditions, the required reward can be derived so as to improve the VoIP platform's revenue. Moreover, we also suggest several targets both in technical and economic view that the platform provider can strive in order to boost his/her market share. In addition, the case of Skype is discussed in this study and we also examine its current pricing strategy.


Conference12th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems: Leveraging ICT for Resilient Organizations and Sustainable Growth in the Asia Pacific Region, PACIS 2008


  • Efficiency-wage model
  • Incentive
  • Skype
  • Supernode
  • VoIP


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