A game theoretic approach for deploying intrusion detection agent

Yi Ming Chen, Dachrahn Wu, Cheng Kuang Wu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

The proposed framework applies two game theoretic models for economic deployment of intrusion detection system (IDS). The first scheme models and analyzes the interaction behaviors of between an attacker and intrusion detection agent within a non-cooperative game, and then the security risk value is derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The second scheme uses the security risk value to compute the Shapley value of intrusion detection agent under the various threat levels. Therefore, the fair agent allocation creates a minimum set of IDS deployment costs. Numerical examples show that the network administrator can quantitatively evaluate the security risk of each intrusion detection agent and easily select the most effective IDS agent deployment to meet the various threat levels.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAgent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems - 10th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2007, Revised Papers
Pages446-451
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event10th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2007 - Bangkok, Thailand
Duration: 21 Nov 200723 Nov 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5044 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference10th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2007
Country/TerritoryThailand
CityBangkok
Period21/11/0723/11/07

Keywords

  • Agent deployment
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Shapley value
  • Threat levels

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