The Principle of Proportionality and Judicial Review - a Strategic Analysis of Constitutional Interpretations

Most of the studies on the principle of proportionality (PR) have hitherto followed the discipline of normative theory. In this study, the strategic behavior model is used to explain how the Justices can realize his constitutional belief as much as possible through the strategic interactions within the institutional constraints. On this basis, the project is set to clarify the following questions:1,The Reflection Stopping function of Review Standards: Both the American review standards and the Germany PR are mere the Justices’ pre-understanding, neither constitutional provided, nor necessarily legitimate.2,the high threshold of constitutional interpretations require a high degree of compromise, the PR is more friendly to interest weighing.3,The Justices are actually weighing up interests, no matter how the Justices combine the Germany and the US models.4,Despite the Shrinking Docket, the results of the PR review are more stringent.5,The Justices are still applying "substantial due process" with PR, hiding their substantial interestweighing.6，the strict scrutiny is formally less friendly to the interest weighing, the Justices have never applied strict scrutiny to hamper interest weighing, but a reasonable review can lead to unconstitutionality.