技術授權與環境企業社會責任

This project intends to study the technology licensing strategy of the licensor whobears the environmental corporate social responsibility in an oligopolistic market.The licensing equilibrium and the associated welfare effect are going to beanalyzed. I will examine that whether licensing is always welfare-improving likewhat happens in the traditional licensing model.A duopolistic model with Cournot competition is utilized for analysis in thisproject. Assume that the technology superior firm concerns not only its own profitbut also the environmental damage due to production process, and considerslicensing its technology to the rival. Both fixed fee and royalty licensing modesare considered. I will compare the licensing equilibrium with the traditional model.In addition, the issues of licensing of the abatement technology, leader-followerdecision, pollution tax, Bertrand price competition, and licensee’s bargainingpower could also be analyzed in this project.